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This paper presents a partial equilibrium analysis of the changes in the
the Norwegian aluminium industry which would follow if the industry was
faced with higher electricity prices. The industry is modelled as an im-
perfectly competitive industry, where the producers recognize their market
power, and where the firms produce products which are imperfect substi-
tutes in demand. The paper provides an empirical implementation of the
model, using panel data for the Norwegian producers. The final part of the
paper presents results from policy simulations on the model. These simula-
tions show that an increase in electricity prices to long term production costs
would essentially eliminate the Norwegian activity in this industry. Never-
theless, the value of the reduced electricity consumption in the aluminium
industry, if this policy is introduced, is more than sufficient to compensate
for the reduction in operating surplus and pay the workers if they are unable
to find alternative jobs. The paper also provides an analysis of the scope for
strategic trade policy in this industry.
'I am deeply grateful to Asbjørn Torvanger and Torstein Bye who contributed considerably in
the preparation of the production data. The author also wants to thank J.K. Dagsvik, P. Fenger
and participants on seminars in the Central Bureau of Statistics and at the University of Oslo
for valuable suggestions and comments.
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This paper is a contribution to the analysis of the welfare consequences of the
cheap electricity sold to the energy intensive industries in Norway. Bye and
Strom (1987) discussed this question, and concluded that as a conservative
estimate, there will be generated a consumer surplus around 1500 millions
Nkr. (1984) if the energy intensive industries in Norway were to pay the same
price as the rest of the economy for their electricity consumption. However,
the welfare analysis was based on a very rough model for the industrial'
involved, both in terms of the industries' demand conditions and their cost
structure. The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a more detailed
analysis of one of the industries which currently receives cheap electricity,
the Norwegian aluminium industry. The policy simulations presented in this
paper confirm the conclusion that there would be considerable welfare gains
if the aluminium industry was faced with the same electricity price as the
rest of the Norwegian economy.
This paper is divided into three parts. Firstly, the paper presents a
theoretical model for a market in intermediary inputs, where there are few
suppliers, but many firms demanding this intermediate input. The model
uses an address approach (see e.g. Lancaster (1979)) in order to model the
demand side of this market. The second part of this paper presents an
empirical implementation of this model for the aluminium industry, using
panel data for the Norwegian part of this industry. These panel data makes
it possible to estimate the degree of substitutability on the demand side
for the different products sold in this industry. Thirdly, the implemented
model is used to analyze the primary question addressed by this paper; the
consequences of altering the electricity prices for the Norwegian firms in the
aluminium industry.
The modeling approach chosen draws on the recent developments in the
theory imperfect competition. The model is one of monopolistic compe-
tition in imperfectly substitutable goods, including oligopolistic elements.
Empirical models for policy analysis in the context of imperfectly compet-
itive industries constitute a small, but growing literature (see e.g. Dixit;
1986, Baldwin and Krugman; 1986, Venables and Smith, 1987. Dahung et
al., 1987, have provided two Norwegian examples). So far, these kinds of
models has not been estimated econometrically. Instead, parameter values
have typically been picked from literature studies or chosen more or less
arbitrary. The rest of the model has been numerically determined based on
a data set from a single year. In this paper, the central parameter of the
model has been estimated using panel data for 14 years (1972-85) and 8
Norwegian firms. The model used in the econometric part of this analysis is
consistent, and in fact draws heavily on the theoretical model employed in
this paper. The rest of the model was based on a panel data set for 4 years.
Hopefully, this implies that the numerical value; involved in this analysis
can be given a bit more weight than some of the previous works in this field
It is a widespread belief that the aluminium industry sells its production
of primary aluminium as one homogeneous good. If that is the case, the
theory of competition in differentiated products would not be appropriate
for this industry. However, there are several pieces of evidence which reveal
that this cannot be the case. Figure 1 displays the development of alu-
minium prices as they are quoted at the London Metal Exchange, the Nor-
wegian trade statistics and U.S.producers prices quoted by "Metals Week".
The figure reveals that there are considerable differences between the price
quoted at the London Metal Exchange, and the prices obtained for Nor-
wegian and U.S. producers of aluminium. Secondly, the micro data show
that the prices per ton aluminium obtained for different Norwegian firms
vary by more than 20 percent as a four year average. Hence, data seem to
expose that aluminium is not an entirely homogeneous product, and hence
Norway is not bound to take prices as given. Aluminium is sold at different
levels of fabrication (bars, sheets, rods, tubes and so forth), in different de-
grees of purity and under different contractual agreements (spot market vs.
long term contracts etc.). However, the empirical results presented below
show that the different variants of aluminium are close substitutes, as one
would expect. Hence, the Norwegian producers face a high price elasticity
of demand.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
description of the Norwegian aluminium industry and its export markets.
Section 3 spells out the theoretical model which is applied in the analysis.
The model gives a detailed description of both the demand side and the
supply side in this industry, and takes into consideration that aluminium
is demanded as an intermediary input into other industries. In section 4
the results from the empirical work are presented. Section 5 contains the
results of the policy simulations on this model. We investigate different pol-
icy questions under alternative assumptions with respect to capacity and
entry conditions for the foreign producers. The section contains an exten-
sive discussion of the consequences of changes in electricity prices, including
the corresponding welfare effects. Section 5 also investigate the scope for
strategic trade policy in this industry. In the last section the results are
summarized and some shortcomings are pointed out.
'See e.g. Daltung et al., (1986), who concluded that the policy implications from their work
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Figure 1: Prices of aluminium 1972-86. The squares refer to Norwegian export
prices, the crosses correspond to U.S. producer prices and the diamonds refer to
the prices quoted at the London Metal Exchange. Sources: Norwegian External
Trade Statistics (NOS) and World Metal Statistics.
2 The aluminium industry
2.1 The Norwegian producers
There are currently seven Norwegian production units in the aluminium
industry. Four of these units belong to Hydro Aluminium, tiiirbelongs
to the company Mosal, and Husnes is an independent producer 2 • One
production plant, Tyssedal, was closed down in 1983. There was a merger
between Hydro Aluminium and Årdal og Sunndal verk (ASV) in 1986.
The average price paid for electricity was 0.08 Nkr/kWh (deflated to
1984) for the period 1983-86. However, there was more than 40 percent dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum price charged. The aluminium
industry buys almost all its electricity according to long term contracts, in
contrast to other parts of the energy intensive industry which buy a sub-
stantial part of the electricity on the "spot-market".
Almost 90 percent of the Norwegian aluminium production was exported
(average 1983-86). 32 percent of the exports went to West-Germany, whereas
18 percent went to U.K. (World Metal Statistics, 1988). The rest of the
2Husnes is registered as an independent enterprise. However, Hydro and Alu-Suiss own 50
percent of the shares each. Hence, it seems ambiguous whether or not one should treat Husnes
as an independent producer.
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Norwegian exports was distributed more or less evenly to other European
countries. Almost nothing was exported outside Europe. Import from Nor-
wegian producers amount to about 18 percent of the consumption of (pri-
mary) aluminium in West Germany. The corresponding figure for U.K. was
31 percent. Assuming that the Norwegian exporters are selling in the same
proportion to all countries implies that Hydro Aluminium, the largest Nor-
wegian company, has a market share around 21 percent in U.K. and 12
percent in West Germany, after the merger in 1986.
2.2 The European aluminium industry
There are several studies of the aluminium industry (Svendsen (1980), Brown
et al. (1983), OECD (1983) and Holloway (1988). According to OECD
(1983, p. 35-39) the annual European production capacity of primary alu-
minium was 3 500 000 tons in 1981-82. OECD (1983, p.127-35) shows how
the structure of ownership is distributed in this industry. It is clear that the
European aluminium industry is dominated by relatively few large compa-
nies (Hydro, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman, Alu-suisse, Alcan).
2.3 The demand for aluminium in Europe
OECD (1983, p.56-68) provides an overview of the main end-use markets
for aluminium. The most important consumers of aluminium in Europe is
the car industry, which absorbs 27.1 of the primary aluminium consumption
in Europe. Building and construction is another large field of application
for aluminium (18.9 percent). Other main buyers of aluminium are the
electrical engineering industry and the packaging industry. In all these in-
dustries there are possible substitutes for aluminium; plastics, iron and steel
in the car industry, plastics in building and construction, copper in electrical
engineering to mention some.
3 The theoretical model
The model presented below assumes that the firms using aluminium as an •
intermediary input, take prices as given. The sellers on the other hand are
relatively large, and behave imperfectly competitive, both due to their size
(oligopolistic competition) and also because they sell imperfect substitutes
(monopolistic competition).
3.1 The .demand side
In the specification of the demand side, I will draw on the recent work by
Anderson et al. (1987), in order to obtain a demand side with a relatively
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simple and tractable functional form on the one hand, but on the other
hand, which is sufficiently rich in structure to be a reasonable description of
the real market. That is to say, I will specify the demand side of the model
as an "address" (location) type model of imperfect competition along the
lines developed by Lancaster (1979) and others. There are many agents on
the demand side which are located differently either in geographical space
or in the space of product characteristics. However, drawing on the work
of Anderson et al., I will restrict the maiel sufficiently to end up with an
aggregate demand system which is consistent with demand obtained from
a single representative consumer with a nested log-linear/CES-type utility
function. In a forthcoming paper by Dagsvik and Klette, we will show that
there is a representative consumer representation of location models under
more general conditions than described below and in the paper by Anderson
et al.
Since my empirical model represents the aluminium industry, it is prefer-
able to derive demand from firms demanding intermediary inputs, rather
than demand generated from one or many consumers as in the analysis by
Anderson et al. Hence, the starting point of this analysis is a firm which
faces the optimization problem:
M
min wx wrmi s.t. y = Ami
al,i
where wi and w are the prices for the factors of production, y is output,
mr is input of the intermediary good produced by the industry in question
(mi corresponds to the amount of aluminium demanded per individual firm
in the industry which uses aluminium as a factor of production, in the
empirical model presented below), x is an index of the input of all other
factors of production. A is a productivity factor. The story now goes as
follows: We assume that there are many variants of the intermediary input,
i.e.
E (2)
where Si. is the set of alternative variants offered. Each variant is located
differently in the n-dimensional characteristics space; variant i is located at
zi, which is an n-dimensional vector. Furthermore we will assume that the
productivity of the firm will decrease with the distance between the location
of the variant the firm chooses, and the firms' optimal choice of input of this
intermediary input. Let us denote the location of the most preferred variant
of the firm in question by î. Hence, we can write this assumption as follows:
A = Aal — ID, A'< O. (3)
if the firm chooses variant i. The expression inside the parenthesis on the
right hand side in equation (3) represents a distance measure between the
location of variant zi and the location of the firm's optimal choice of this
intermediary input, located at î. We assume that the firm follows a two
1-a (1)
stage decision procedure: (0 First the firm chooses what variant of the
intermediary input it wants to buy. (ii) Then the firm determines how much
it wants to buy of each factor of production.
It is straight forward to show that the cost function corresponding to the





where k is a constant. Equation (4) expresses the cost function for the
firm, conditional on the choice of the variant. Hence, the conditional factor
demand for the intermediary input can be expressed
dc kay wl-mr = = 	
	dwr	 Aw1-11 	 (5)
We can now turn to the first stage of the firm's decision process. Fol-
lowing Anderson et al. we assume that the location of variants are given,
and located in a symmetric fashion. It turns out that, from a theoretical
point of view, a convinient choice of location pattern is as follows. Variant
i is located at the point
= a if i =
-a otherwise
except for variant n which is located at (-a, -a, • - , -a). Superscript j
refers to the coordinate axis in the characteristics space. Furthermore, we
will assume that AO has the specific functional form
	




i.e. a bell shaped form similar to the normal distribution. The central idea
in this approach is now to claim that the firms demanding this intermedi-
ary input is distributed in the characteristic space according to their most
preferred variant. Given that the characteristics space is rich enough (see
Anderson et al., 1987), given the characterization of the firms and the loca-
tion of the variants offered, one can show that the firms which are indifferent
between using variants n and j are located at a hyperplane orthogonal to
the j-axis at
. a log(w Iwn)
V = 	2	 (7)4ab
where wi and wn are the prices of variant j and n respectively. All firms
located at zi > ii will prefer variant j to variant n. Hence, if we denote the
distribution of firms in characteristics space with 1 (z) , demand for variant
n can be expressed
1—a filayw
Xn = 	 J-00
—vs
• • f(z)dz' • • • dz' ' (8)
It is possible to show that if the distribution function (z) is of the multino-
mial logit form, the aggregate demand function will take the CES functional
form. That is to say, f(z) has the functional form
4ab)n--1	 rgs,vexp	
z
f (z) = M	 (n - 1)! 	
[1 -I- E7,71. exp
where M is the total mass of firms ("the number of firms"), and p/4ab is a
measure of degree of concentration of the firms around origo. A high value
of 0/4ab indicates a low degree of concentration and vice versa. Using the
approach developed by Anderson et al. (1987), given (9), the aggregate





Notice that the price elasticity of demand can be attributed to two different
sources in this framework:
• Firstly, the individual firms using this input have the possibility of
substituting the intermediary input on which we focus, and some other
inputs (e.g. between aluminium and say, plastics).
• Secondly, the individual firms can substitute between the different vari-
ants of the intermediary input (different variants of aluminium).
Both these substitution possibilities are reflected in the demand equation
(10), and will give a contribution to the price elasticity facing the individual
firms selling the intermediary input.
Let us assume that the cost share of the intermediary input (a) is negli-
gible relative to (1+ 1/p) 4 . In that case the aggregate demand function has
exactly the CES functional form. Good n is not essentially different from
the other variants of this intermediary input. Hence, we can carry trough




3.2 The supply side
Let us now turn to the firms supplying this intermediary inputs. These firms
also faces a two-stage decision problem. Firstly, they have to choose which
3Dagsvik and Klette (forthcoming) shows that similar and more general aggregate demand
systems can be derived under less restrictive assumptions about the density distribution of con-
sumers, dimensionality of characteristics space, etc.
4The econometric work presented below shows that 1 + 1/is to give an estimate of a value
- around 6. The cost share of aluminium, say, in the car industry, is probably much below 0.1.
(9)
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variant(s) to produce. Secondly, given this choice, they have to decide how
much to produce and/or what price to charge for this variant. However, I
will not provide an analysis of the first stage of this decision process, but
follow earlier works in this field (see e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), and
assume that each production unit produces a different variant of this good.
I assume that the firms have quantities as their strategy variable. That
is, I will investigate a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the second stage of the
firms decision problem. That firms have quantities as their strategy variable
is reasonable if they have to commit themselves to the choice of inputs before
sales are determined. This seems to be the case in the aluminium industry
where intermediary inputs (bauxite) have to be ordered in advance 5 .
The firms face the following decision problem
MCC [Wi(Xi)Xi — Ci(Xj)] = 1, • • • /I (12)
where w(X1) is the inverse demand function corresponding to equation (11).
Ci (Xi) is total costs of producing Xi. Let us furthermore allow for the
postkibility that the firms might face capacity constraints:
< Ki, = 1, ••• ,n (13)
Solving the optimization problem given by (12), subject to (11) and (13),
gives the following price setting rule in Cournot-Nash equilibrium (see Klette,




= • • • , n (14)
/ 
dCi(Xi) 
cs =	 = 1,• • • ,n	 (15)dXi
are the marginal costs. Ai is the Lagrange parameter associated with the
capacity constraint for firm i, (13), which will be zero if the constraint is
not binding, and, to put it briefly, take whatever value is necessary in order
to clear the market if the constraint is binding. Furthermore; p = 1/(1+ p),
and si is the market share of firm i:
wixi
81 17- r•rs	 y44=1 xi/ideal (16)
50n the other hand, stockholding is important in this industry. In periods with large stocks,
one might argue that competition in prices is a better approximation to the nature of competition
in this market. However, as shown e.g. in Klette (1987), price setting rules will not be substan-
tially different in the Nash-Bertrand game if the number of competitors is not too small or the
goods are not too close substitutes. The market equilibriums presented in this paper would as a
consequence not have been substantially different if we assumed that firms compete in prices.
where
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One might notice that the more spread out the firms on the demand side
are in terms of distribution of optimal choice of input (that is the higher is
ti), the higher will the margin between marginal costs and price charged be,
according to (14). This is reasonable, since a more spread out population on
the demand side will reduce the price elasticity of demand for the individual
variants 6 .
The two sets of equations (11) and (14) completely determine the market
equilibrium.
3.3 The firms' technology
We assume that the individual firms on the supply side have Leontief tech-
nology 7. That is to say, the individual firms have no substitution possibili-
ties. Formally, we can express this as follows
XII < min(zikLi ,	 , zf Ei)	 (17)
where i refers to the Norwegian firms (notice that we do not describe the
production technology in similar detail for the foreign producers, since we
assume that they will face fixed factor prices, and 'hence will have constant
marginal costs). Li, Mi and Ei are the individual firms input of labour ,
intermediary inputs (except electricity) and electricity respectively. , ztj
and zf are the corresponding unit production coefficients for the individual
firms.
4 Empirical implementation of the model
4.1 The econometric model
In the theoretical presentation of the model above, we assumed a lot of sym-
metry which is likely not to be consistent with any real markets. E.g. it was
assumed that the distribution of firms on the demand side and the goods of-
fered were symmetrically located in characteristics space. Also, we assumed
that productivity losses for the firms on the demand side due to non-optimal
inputs would be the same for deviations from the optimal choice of char-
acteristics, in all directions in characteristics space. These assumptions are
too strong when we want to implement this model empirically. I conjecture
that it is consistent with some relaxations of the symmetry assumptions
°More precisely; what matters is the density on the demand side relative to the distance in
charcteristics space between the variants offered and the costs (productivity losses) associated
with deviations from the optimal choice of variant.
'See Forsund and Jansen (1983) for a brief description of the technology for production of
aluminium.
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mentioned, to end up with an aggregate demand system of the more general
CES-functional form
o	 1+1iw7( /0)
= N 	  i = 1,• • ,n	 (18)81tv; ihs
where N is a new constant term.






If the capacity constraints are not binding everything on the right hand side
is observable in principle. The results presented below are derived under
the assumption that the capacity constraints were not binding for the Nor-
wegian producers in the period 1972-86. Cappelen and Jansen (1984) have
provided a detailed study of capacity utilization in the Norwegian aluminium
industry for the period 1960-81. Their results are vaguely consistent with
my assumption, with a possible exception for 1977. Notice that in periods
when the capacity constraints are binding the right hand side of (19) is
not observable. Hence, observations for years when the capacity constraints
are binding should be eliminated in the estimation. However, experiments
by omitting observations for 1977 showed that the results presented below
where not sensitive in this respect.
I have employed the assumption that marginal costs corresponds to the
sum of labour costs, material costs and energy costs. On the one hand,
this seems to underestimate the true marginal costs, since one would like to
include maintenance costs among the marginal costs. On the other hand,
some of the labour costs might be regarded as fixed costs from the firms'
point of view. The overall bias therefore seems to be ambiguous.
There is another aspect of equation (19) which deserves some comments,
and that is the market share indicator, N. First of all, the right hand side
of equation (19) has been calculated for all the Norwegian producers for the
period 1972 to 1986. Since, some of this production units are controlled by
the same company, I have used the companies' market share rather than the
production units' market share. Secondly, the size of the relevant market is
not well defined. There is no clear or operational definition of what one is
to understand as the market size, or in practice which firms are competing
with the Norwegian firms. I have assumed that the market in my awe is the
market for what is called primary aluminium. Next, one has to take into
consideration what part of this market is actually (or potentially) in compe-
tition with the Norwegian producers. E.g. what regions of the world, both
on the demand side and the supply side, is relevant for the Norwegian pro-
ducers. I ended up using the following approach: I assumed that the market
shares for the individual Norwegian companies in the U.K. and West Ger-
many are representative for all the markets these companies compete in.
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The primary justification for this assumption is that they absorb about 50
percent of Norwegian exports. One might argue that for this precise rea-
son, my approach overestimate the average market share for the Norwegian
companies. However, - in other countries (e.g. Sweden), the Norwegian com-
panies have a considerably higher market share than in the U.K. and West
Germany, whereas in countries like Italy, the market share is negligible.
Data is not avaiable for the individual companies' export to individual
countries. However, it is possible to obtain data for Norwegian exports to
individual countries, as well as total consumption of primary aluminium
in the corresponding countries. I have assumed that export shares to the
different countries by individual Norwegian companies are fixed proportions,
according to companies' shares in total Norwegian production of aluminium.
Hence, I ended up with the following approximation formula for the
market share indicator for company j:
X, 	EuK  e  e
= 	 (20)x Eux EG cU K EU K EG cG
where 3 refers to the Norwegian companies. Xi and X are production of com-
pany j and ail Norwegian companies respectively. EvIc and EG represents
Norwegian exports to U.K. and West Germany c•U K and CG correspond
to total consumption of primary aluminium in the two countries. All these
variables are in terms of tons of aluminium, rather than in value terms. This
is due to the fact that data are available in physical units rather than in
value terms, which would have been preferable from a theoretical point of
view.
Since, there are several sources of measurement errors in the econometric
implementation of equation (19), an enor term should be added as follows
cit
p = 	 eit	 (21)wit (1 — sit)
where eit captures measurement errors, and possible deviations between ac-
tual behavior and the relativly simple model I have employed. The subscript
t refers to the time-coordinate. If
then
Eeit =





will provide an unbiased estimate for p, where the hats above the variables
on the right hand side of (23), refer to the observations and estimates for
the corresponding variables. N is the set of all Norwegian producers (obser-
vations for the foreign producers were nelt available). T denotes the number
of periods with observations.
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In order to estimate the 6-parameters in equation (18), I used the fol-
lowing model, which can be derived from (18)
81
 wi ( )
	
(24)
Since I do not have quantities and prices for individual foreign firms, I
assumed that the foreign firms are all identical.
The production coefficients (cf. equation (17) has been determined by
dividing labour inputs, intermediary inputs and electricity inputs by produc-
tion for the individual (Norwegian) firms. All these variables were calculated
as four year averages (1983-86).
4.2 The data
In order to estimate the p-parameter by equation (25), I used data for the
period 1972-86 for all the Norwegian production units.
The production data for the Norwegian production units are taken from
the Norwegian manufactoring statistics. A detailed description of this ex-
tracted data base is given in Torvanger (1988). The data base contains plant
specific price indexes for output, labour and energy as well as value figures
for output and the three factors of production; energy material inputs and
labour.
The data needed to calculate the market shares by equation (20) were
obtained from World Metal Statistics (several volumes).
The 6-parameters were calibrated to the data set for the base-year, which
was constructed by taking average price- and quantity-data for the period
1983-86 (deflated to 1984). This period was chosen for two reasons. Firstly,
several years was needed in order two average out business cycle phenom-
ena 8. Secondly, the years 1981 and 1982 were quite extraordinary for the
aluminium industry (see e.g. OECD, 1983) which during these years ex-
perienced a severe depression, with a low level of demand combined with
the high energy prices following from the rise in oil prices in 1979. As a
consequence, there were considerable structural changes in the industry at
the end of this period, including scrapping of capacity (see OECD, 1983).
Hence, my belief is that the years before 1983 are not representative for
the present and future state of this industry. That is the reason why years
before 1983 have been omitted in the construction of the base data for the
model.
8An alternative treatment would have been to calibrate the model to alternative base years
within a business cycle. See Dixit (1986) for an example of this approach.
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Figure 2: The right hand side of equation (13) (average for all Norwegians firms).
4.3 Estimation results
Figure 2 shows the average value for the Norwegian producers for the right
hand side of equation (14), assuming that A is zero for all producers, i.e.
that the capacity constraints are not binding.
There is one outlier in the sample which seems to be running with neg-
ative operating surplus for the whole period 1975 to 1983. This production
unit has been omitted from the calculations presented in figure 2. The other
firms displayed a reasonably stable value for the RHS of (14), with one no-
table exception which shows up in figure 2. That is the peak in 1981 and
1982 where the margin between output price and marginal costs where close
to zero for most of the firms. There is no apparent trend in the RHS of (14)
for any of the firms.
The estimates obtained for the p parameter were 0.91 (standard deviation
0.134) when the outlier was included and 0.88 (standard deviation 0.099)
when it was excluded.
In the simulation I used the estimate obtained by omitting the outlier.
Estimating the p-value for the outlier independently gave a value signifi-
cantly above unity, which is not a permissable value. There are several
possible explanations for this result: It might be due to systematic measure-
ment errors, e.g. that marginal costs for the outlier in fact are systematically
lower than what I have defined as marginal costs above. Alternatively, the
company might not be operating at a maximum profit level as defined by the
model above, e.g. due to tactical considerations. For instance, governmen-
tal goodwill and cheap electricity might be reduced if the firm (the outlier)
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was closed down. The firm, as most of this industry, is located in rural
areas, where the preservation of jobs are given priority by the Norwegian
government. Alternatively, other tactical considerations might be omitted
from the picture I have outlined above. Possibly, the outlier is operated for
strategic reasons, in order to keep new entrants out of the market. This is
an issue which could possibly be analyzed by our model, i.e. to investigate
whether company profit is higher with the outlier producing compared to a
situation where it is closed down and we allow for new entry into the indus-
try. However, having given the issue some thoughts, I will leave it and carry
on with the main task of this paper.
5 Policy analysis
5.1 The consequences of altering electricity prices
As mentioned in the introduction, the primary motivation for this study is
to analyze the effects of increasing the electricity prices to the aluminium
industry up to the price level paid by the rest of the economy, or some other
relevant price level.
What price level one should compare to, is a matter of controversy.
Hence, I will investigate two alternatives:
• Alternative 1: Market clearing price as calculated by Bye and Strom
(1987) by means of the MSG-model. They found an energy price at
0.126 Nkr/kWh (1984).
• Alternative 2: Current long term costs on the production of electric-
ity for certain deliveries corrected for energy-intensive industries, as
calculated by Johnsen (1986). This implies a price of 0.26 Nkr/kWh
9
Also, it is not clear what situation exists in this market with respect
to the response from foreign producers as the Norwegian aluminium export
gets more expensive. That is to say, it is not clear to what extent one could
expect expansion of production in existing plants outside Norway. This is
a question to what extent there exists excess capacity abroad, or whether
there are possibilities for entry by new firms. OECD (1983) argue that new
entry by European producers is not likely. This is due to the fact that in
order to enter this industry, producers are dependent on heavily subsidized
electricity, which is not likely to be supplied to this industry from European
9Another price of interest could possibly be the export price for Norwegian electricity. How-
ever, the current export prices varies considerably from year to year and falls below and in the
lower part of the interval spanned by alternative 1 and 2. This is due to the fact that Norwe-
gian exports of electricity are currently traded in the (Scandinavian) 'spot market". Probably,
exports in ternis of fixed contracts will give a price much above this level.
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governments. On the other hand, Brazil and other Third World countries
intend to expand their output of primary aluminium, which possibly could
penetrate the European market.
Hence, I have carried out several simulation scenarios:
• Alternative a: There is no excess capacity among the foreign producers,
neither any prospect of entry by new producers.
• Alternative b: There is excess capacity in the industry, but no possi-
bility of entry by new producers.
• Alternative c: There is no constraints on capacity, nor on entry.
One might argue that alternative a) and b) correspond to the medium run,
while alternative c) might correspond to the long run. However, as will be
clear below, there is not much difference between alternative b) and c) in
numerical terms. The number of firms operating in the industry under free
entry has been calculated in the following way: The central assumption is
that entry is only credible if the new production units produce at least 100
000 tons per 1° • The equilibrium number of foreign producers is calculated
as the largest number of firms consistent with this restriction.
I do not have micro data on the price charged by foreign producers. The
price charged by foreign producers is assumed to be equal to the average
price charged by the Norwegian producers in the period 1983-86. This cor-
responds to 11000 Nkr/tons. The price on the spot market is below this
value; 9550 Nkr/tons on average for the period 1983-86.
Below I will present the results for some different combinations of alter-
natives, e.g. alternative la) corresponds to an increase in current electricity
prices to 0.126 Nkr/kWh, given that there is no excess capacity in the in-
dustry, nor any possibilities for entry. And so -forth for alternative lb), lc),
2a) etc. Due to the confidential nature of the data I have used, I will only
present summary measures of the results. I have excluded the outlier from
these summary measures, since this production unit seems to run with neg-
ative operating surplus even at today's energy prices. Consequently, it will
be closed down under all the policy scenarios presented below.
Alternative la:
This case involves an increase in electricity prices to 0.126 Nkr/kWh. We
assume no free capacity on behalf of the foreign producers, neither any
possibility for entry by new producers.
The main results are displayed in table 1. This table shows that on
average there will be a 10.3 percent increase in production costs. This will
not fully be passed over to the consumers, who will face on average a 6.5
percent increase in prices from the Norwegian producers. At the same time
'°OECD (1983), assumes a abase' plant of 200 000 tons yearly capacity in their cost analysis.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































foreign producers will increase their prices with 4.8 percent, due to increasing
demand. The result is a fall in production of 6.6 percent_on average for the
Norwegian producers. The value of the reduced electricity consumption is
329 mill Nkr. Overall employment will fall by 19.4 percent 11
There are however considerable differences between the Norwegian plants.
Minimum cost rise is 7.2 percent, whereas maximum is 13.8 percent. The
corresponding figures for price changes is 0 percent, versus 13.1 percent.
With respect to production some Norwegian firms actually expand produc-
tion 12. The firm which leaves its price fixed expands its output by 45
percent. Another Norwegian firm expands by 19 percent. However, the
general picture is a decline production; maximum reduction is 46 percent.
One firm enlarges its profit by 1 percent, maximum decline in profit is 36
percent.
Alternative lb:
In this scenario the price increase on electricity is the same as above. How-
ever, in this case we assume that there is no binding capacity constraint in
the industry. No entry of new foreign producers is assumed to take place.
The average cost increase is the same as above. However prices rise some-
what less in this case; 5.1 percent on average. The expansion in demand,
facing foreign producers in this case is matched by an escalation of produc-
tion, while the foreigners' price remains almost unchanged. The reduction
in prices in this case can be explained by the fact that Norwegian producers
faces a more elastic demand in this case, since the foreign producers do not
augment their prices as demand increases, in contrast to the previous case.
However, despite the lower boost in prices, output falls considerably more
in this case; by 19.2 percent on average. The decline in operating surplus is
635 mill. Nkr. Employment in this industry falls by 29.3 percent.
As above, one firm leaves its price unchanged. On the other extreme
another firm escalates its price by 11 percent. The firm leaving its price
unchanged expands its activity level by 20 percent. In this case all firms
have a decline in their operating surplus, varying between 18 to 46 percent.
11This figure deviates from the average fall in production which was calculated as an arithmetic
mean for the 6 plants, whereas the fall in employment is calculated incorporating all 7 units
currently producing, including the outlier which will be closed down.
120ne might argue that it would be more consistent with the other assumption in this sim-
ulation, to assume that also the Norwegian producers have access to no free capacity. On the
other hand, there will be released a substantial amount of electricity in the Norwegian part of
the industry if this policy was introduced. Hence, the supply of electricity would presumably not
be a limiting factor for the Norwegian producers, possibly in contrasts to the foreign producers.
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Alternative lc:
In this alternative we assume that there is no constraints on capacity or
entry, but the price increase is as above.
The boost in costs is as explained above, but in this case the rise in
prices is smaller, on average 4.7 percent. That is to say, the swelling costs
are reducing the profit margin to a larger extent in this case compared to
the previous cases. The fall in average output is 22.7 percent, which is
higher than in the *previous case. This is due to competition from 2 new
entrants in addition to the existing foreign firms in the industry. The result
is a fall in operating surplus for the Norwegian producers of 706 mill. Nkr.
Employment will decline by 32.1 percent in this case. The value of the
electricity which is not used by the industry any longer is 538 mill. Nkr.
The differences between the firms are relatively similar to the picture in
the previous case, and I will not go through it again.
Alternative 2a:
In this scenario, electricity prices are increased to 0.26 Nkr/kWh. There
is no expansion of foreign output, since there is assumed to exist no free
capacity, nor any possibility for entry.
Table 1 shows that on average, the augmentation of electricity prices will
lead to a rise in marginal costs of 37.8 percent. This cost increase will only
partly be passed over to the consumer, who will experience a price elevation
of 28.4 percent. The price increase will lead to a substantial decline in
activity; 52.8 percent on average. In terms of operating surplus there is
a reduction of 1052 mill. Nkr. The value of the cutback in electricity
consumption is 1978 mill. Nkr. Employment in this industry declines by
57.5 percent as a consequence of this boost in electricity prices.
Minimum cost increase is 33 percent, maximum 43 percent. The corre-
sponding price figures are 23 percent and 35 percent. On the production
side there are considerable differences; minimum reduction in output is 35
percent versus a maximum at 70 percent. Operating surplus fall between 44
percent to 68 percent.
Alternative 2b:
In this case there is excess capacity abroad, but no possibilities for entry.
The electricity price is raised to 0.26 Nkr/kWh as above.
The increases in costs are of course the same as above. The rise in prices
are-smaller; on average they increase by 24.8 percent. Average fall in activity
level is 74.5 percent, and operating surplus is reduced by 1497 mill. Nkr. for
the Norwegian part of this industry. Employment will fall by 76.2 percent.
The value of the reduction in electricity consumption is 2607 mill. Nkr.
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Price augmentation varies between 20 and 31 percent. Three out of the
six plants have their production reduced by 80 percent or more. Minimum
contraction in output is 73 percent. Operating surplus falls between 67
percent and 83 percent.
Alternative 2c:
This scenario assumes no constraints on behalf of the foreign producers
with respect to capacity or entry. The electricity price is the same as in the
previous case; 0.26 Nkr/kWh.
The picture in this case is very similar to the previous case; prices in-
crease by 24.2 percent, output falls by 78.2 percent on average, and oper-
ating surplus is reduced by 1564 mill. Nkr. for the Norwegian producers.
The value of the electricity which the industry doesn't consume after the
electricity price rise, is 2718 mill. Nkr. There is entry by 4 new foreign
firms.
I will not elaborate on the detailed description of changes for the indi-
vidual plants, since they are very similar to the changes described in the
previous case.
5.2 Welfare considerations
It has been proposed that Norway should close down its energy intensive
industry, and sell the electricity on long term contracts to Sweden, and at
the same time stop the building of hydro electric power plants. It is not an
unreasonable estimate that electricity sold to Sweden according to long-term
contracts could obtain at least a price at 0.26 Nkr/kWh, which is the long
term production costs of electricity in Norway, as mentioned above.
Policy simulation 2a) - 2c) presented above can be used to study the
welfare effects of this proposal. It is reasonable to assume that it takes time
to establish new production plants, and so in the short/medium run scenario
2c) is not appropriate. If there exists no free capacity among Norway's
competitors, scenario 2a) shows that Norwegian output would be reduced
to less than half of the current level. Employment would correspondingly
decline by more than 50 percent. Operating surplus would decline by more
than 1 billion Nkr. On the other hand the electricity which now becomes
available, has a value of almost 2 billion Nkr. This implies that even if there
is no alternative use for labour (which is not an unrealistic possibility in
the short run) this value exceeds the reduction in operating surplus and the
decline in wage payments by 242 mill. Nkr (see last column in table 1). That
is to say, the workers and the firm owners could be fully compensated for
they reduced incomes, and there would still be an annual surplus of 242 mill.
Nkr. If there are alternative employment opportunities for the workers, the
surplus is 925 mill. Nkr. on an annual basis.
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If there exists free capacity in the rest of this industry, the reduction in
the activity level among the Norwegian producers would be larger. However,
the larger loss in operating surplus among the Norwegian producers in this
case, is in value ternis more than balanced by the value of the increased
amount of released electricity. If the workers have no alternative employment
opportunities, but is fully compensated, there would be surplus of 202 mill.
Nkr. per year. If the workers can get alternative employment, net surplus
exceeds 1 billion Nkr. per year.
In the long run, entry into the industry might be feasible, but this will
give rise to welfare consequences which is fairly similar to the free capacity
case discussed above.
It is worth stressing that one should not place to much emphasis on
the exact figures in this exercise, since the parameters in the model has
been determined from data which do not involve changes of the order of
magnitude involved in this policy exercise. Nevertheless, the rough picture is
probably robust: The reduction in employment and profits will be dramatic
if electricity prices where to be changed to 0.26 Nkr/kWh. However, the
value of the reduced electricity consumption in the aluminium industry is
sufficient to more than compensate for the cutback in operating surplus and
possible need or compensation to the workers which will have to leave their
jobs.
Similar arguments can be carried through in the other policy alternative
presented above, where the electricity price is set to 0.126 Nkr/kWh. The
numbers presented in table 1 show that the value of the reduced electricity
consumption in the aluminium industry is much lower in this case, which is
obviuos. The table demonstrate that the value of this electricity will not be
sufficent to counterbalance the losses in operating surplus, not to mention
compensation to dismissed workers. However, in this case there will be
an additional welfare gain in comparison to the policy alternative where
electricity prices is changed to 0.26 Nkr/kWh. That is to say, if electricity is
sold to Norwegian companies and consumers for 0.126 Nkr/kWh, there will
be generated larger consumer surpluses and possibly increases in operating
surplus in several industries. To quantify this effects a general equilibrium
model is required, and hence I will not be able to provide a complete welfare
analysis of this case.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
There are at least two parameters which contains uncertainty in the model
presented above and which might be of some importance for the results.
That is the number of foreign competitors/size of the market and the substi-
tution parameter on the demand side. In table 2 I have presented results for
some sensitivity analysis for these parameters. I used the policy simulation

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first analysis involved an expansion of the number of competitors by
100 percent, and a corresponding increase on the demand side. The results
presented in table 2 prove that the results are robust with respect to changes
in the market size.
The last row in table 2 presents the outcome of the policy scenario when
the substitution parameter on the demand side was increased by 5 percent.
The results are robust with respect to the qualitative aspects, both in terms
of the consequences as described by the model, as well as with respect to the
welfare consequences. However, the quantitative picture is quite sensitive
to changes in this parameter. In particular, the reduction in the operating
surplus fôr the Norwegian part of the industry would be larger in this case,
as one would expect. Consequently, the net surplus from the policy reform
would be smaller, the higher the substitutiön parameter. Notice however,
that even if the workers would be unemployed but fully compensated, there
is a net welfare gain to be obtained. And if the workers were able to find
alternative jobs, the net surplus would be approximately 1 billion Nkr. per
year, according to the model.
5.4 Strategic trade policy
In industries with imperfect competition there are arguments in favour of
policy intervention (see Dixit (1987) for a recent survey, and Klette (1987)
for an analysis which is close to the case studied in this paper). The basic
arguments in the case of purely exporting industrim are as follows:
• There is a so-called "profit-pooline argument in favour of an export
tax. That is to say, in order to obtain an export price which is close
to the cooperative outcome for the domestic producers, there is a case
in favour of an export tax.
• There is also a so-called "profit-shifting" argument in favour of a sub-
sidy to exporting industries. This subsidy will strengthen the com-
petitive position for the domestic producers in the foreign market.
Thereby, the domestic firms will increase their market shares. Since
there is assumed to be profits in this industry, this increase in mar-
ket shares will enable the domestic firms to capture more of the profit
than they would have done without the subsidy. It turns out that this
increase in profit might be sufficiently large to justify a subsidy.
Which of the two arguments dominates depends on the nature of the indus-
try. In Klette (1987), I have discussed this in some detail for the case of
a fixed number of foreign and domestic firms, which are facing no capacity
constraints. In this section of the paper I will present an analysis of this
question under the three alternative responses of foreign firms presented in
section 5.1; a) no free capacity nor free entry, b) free capacity but no entry
and c) free capacity and free entry.
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Alternative la lb lc 2a 2b
(%) 12.9 -3.7 -7.3 7.5 -2.1 -2.9
AR 	 (mill.Nkr) 127 15 56 38
Table 3 : The simulation results for an optimal export tax under alternative
assumptions with respect to capacity and entry among foreign firms. t* is the
size of the optimal tax rate. A R is the changes in total revenue compared to
the non- intervention case (mill. Nkr (1984)).
The optimal export tax is determined so that total revenue is maximized
(see Klette, 1987). That is, the problem is to solve
max E (war, -	 (25)
iEN
where t is an ad valorem tax on the exports for all the Norwegian producers.
N is the set of all Norwegian producers. The Norwegian producers are of
course still assumed to maximize their profits.
The simulation results are presented in table 3. The results show that if
there is free capacity and/or free entry there is a case for an export subsidy;
from 2.1 to 7.3 percent. The force driving these results are the so called
profit-shifting motive: Strengthening the domestic producers competitive
position by a subsidy, might increase sales and thereby profits sufficiently to
justify a subsidy. If there is no free capacity nor any possibilities for entry,
there is a case for an export tax.
However, as table 3 reveals, the changes in net national revenue from
an optimal policy intervention in this industry are fairly small, at least in
scenarios which allow for the existence of free capacity and/or free entry.
6 Final remarks and conclusions
This paper has presented a model for the Norwegian aluminium industry
and its competitors. Policy simulations on this model shows that the conse-
quences of altering the electricity prices will be dramatic. I have discussed
some welfare consequences of such changes. For instance the analysis indi-
cate that if the electricity prices were increased to 0.26 Nkr/kWh there will
be almost a full close down of the Norwegian aluminium industry. However,
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if 0.26 Nkr/kWh is the opportunity costs for Norwegian electricity (export
to Sweden and/or a freeze in the building of hydro electric power plants) the
revenue (or cost saving) from the sales of electricity (or the reduced costs in
construction of power plants) is more than sufficient to offset the reduction
in the industry's operating surplus and possible costs to compensate the
workers if they are not able to find alternative jobs. Net surplus will be,
according to this analysis, of the order of magnitude 200 - 1000 mill. Nkr
per year, depending on the possibilities of alternative employment for the
workers which will leave the industry.
There are some limitations of the present study. I have mentioned that
one should be somewhat careful with the exact figures presented above, the
order of magnitude is what deserves attention. This is due to the large
changes involved in the policy simulation, and possible errors in the global
properties of the mathematical model.
The analysis presented in this paper has ignored some possible costs and
benefits which deserve attention. One important point is the neglect of the
cumulative effects of a close down of this industry on the industry's economic
environment. A substantial part of the living houses and different kinds
of infrastructure connected with the societies tied to this industry might
be valueless if the aluminium industry is closed down, since several of the
production plants are located in rural areas with possibly small opportunities
for creation of new industry and jobs.
On the other hand it is fact that the aluminium industry produce large
amounts of pollution, which has a damaging effect on the environment. Also,
many would be inclined to argue that the social costs of the production of
electricity exceeds long run production costs as reported above, due to the
damage hydro electric power plants impose on their environment. Both
these arguments would strengthen the case for escalation of the electricity
prices.
The analysis of the scope for strategic policy intervention in this industry
revealed that there are relatively small gains to be obtained from policy
intervention if there is free capacity and/or free entry for foreign producers.
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